British  Ag^gresl 


I 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  ON   1 


-BY- 


WILLIAM  L.  SCRUGGS; 

Late  Envoy  Extraordinary  and  Minister  Plenipotentiary  of  the 
United  States  to  Colombia  and  to  Venezuela. 


THIRD  EDITION. 


ATLANTA,  GA.: 
The  Franklin  Printing  and  Publishing  Co. 

i8q5. 


V 

British  Ajrgressions  in  Venezuela, 


-0?.- 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  ON  TRIAL, 


-BY- 


WILLIAM  L.  SCRUGGS; 

Late  Envoy  Extraordinary  and  Minister  Plenipotentiary  of  the 
United  States  to  Colombia  and  to  Venezuela. 


Tmnn  EDITION. 


ATLANTA.  GA.: 
The  Franklin  Printing  and  Publishing  Co. 
1895. 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Arciiive 

in  2007  witin  funding  from 

IVIicrosoft  Corporation 


http://www.arcliive.org/details/britisliaggressioOOscruiala 


A'1  S¥b£ 


CONTENTS. 


I.  Geographical  position  of  the  country  in  dispute — When  and 
how  the  controversey  originated — Venezuela  the  successor  in 
title  of  Spain  in  1810;  England  the  successor  in  title  of  Hol- 
land in  1814. 

II.  How  Spain  acquired  title ;  how  Holland  acquired  title — The 
boundary  line  between  them  clearly  indicated  by  historical 
facts — That  line  the  rightful  one  between^ Venezuela  and 
British  Guinea. 

III.  Great  Britain's  claim  in  virtue  of  treaties  with  Indian  occu- 

pants not  valid — Nor  did  the  territory  become  derelict  by 
the  revolt  of  1810 — Title  not  affected  by  failure  to  occupy 
«  the  territory — Principles  and  precedents — How  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  is  involved. 

IV.  Brief  review  of  the  controversy — How  England  has  utilized 

delay  of  settlement — V^enezuela's  repeated  efforts  to  refer  the 
dispute  to  arbitration — Probable  reason  for  England's  re- 
fusal to  submit  her  claim  to  arbitration. 

V.  Magnitude  and  manifest  purpose  of  the  British  aggressions  in 
the  Orinoco  valley — A  standing  menace  to  autonomous  gov- 
ernment on  the  South  American  continent — Seizure  of  the 
Island  of  Patos. 

VI.  Attitude  of  the  United  States  and  of  the  other  American  Re- 
publics— The  vital  principles  involved — Shall  those  princi- 
ples be  now  abandoned  or  enforced  ? 


BRITISH  AGGRESSIONS  IN  VENEZUELA. 


On  the  northeastern  shores  of  the  South  American  continent, 
extending  westward  and  southward  from  the  Atlantic  ocean  and 
the  gulf  of  Paria  to  the  Orinoco  river  and  the  watersheds  of  the 
Amazon,  is  a  vast  expanse  of  rich  and  beautiful,  though  as  yet 
but  sparsely  populated  country,  known  as  the  Guayanas.  ^  Such 
is  its  peculiar  topographical  conformation  that,  although  within 
the  lines  of  the  tropics,  it  has  great  diversity  of  climate,  and  is 
capable  of  almost  every  variety  of  agricultural  product  common  to 
the  temperate  zone.  Its  natural  wealth  of  soil,  mine,  and  forest  is 
almost  incalculable ;  while  its  favored  geographical  position,  fine 
harbors,  and  network  of  navigable  rivers  place  it  in  the  very  front 
rank  of  future  commercial  possibilities. 

A  portion  of  this  vast  domain  belongs  to  England,  as  the  suc- 
cessor in  title  of  Holland ;  but  a  very  much  larger  and  more  desir- 
able portion  of  it  belongs  to  the  Republic  of  Venezuela  as  the 
successor  in  title  of  Spain. ^  The  precise  boundary  between  the 
two  ancient  possessions,  although  clearly  inferable  from  historical 
facts,  was  never  definitely  fixed  by  treaty;  and  now,  after  the  lapse 
of  many  decades,  Venezuela  and  Great  Britain  are  parties  to  a 
boundary  dispute  which  has  interrupted  their  friendly  intercourse. 
Not  only  have  their  diplomatic  relation?  been  suspended  since  1887, 
but  the  persistent  aggressions  of  the  stronger  power  upon  the  terri- 
tory and  jurisdiction  of  the  weaker,  have  reached  a  point  which 


1  So  designated  on  all  the  old  maps  of  the  country.  It  was  the  name  given  to 
the  whole  immense  area  bounded  south  by  the  Amazon,  west  by^the  Orinoco,  and 
north  and  east  by  the  Atlantic  ocean.  It  was  called  by  Sir  Walter  Raleigh  "that 
mighty,  rich,  and  beautiful  Empire  of  Guinea";  by  the  less  enthusiastic  Dutch 
navigators  "the  Wild  Coast";  and  by  the  Spaniards  " El  Dorado."  The  fable 
of  El  Dorado,  however,  seems  to  have  had  its  origin  on  the  coast  of  what  is  now 
the  Republic  of  Colombia;  to  have  passed  thence  to  the  interior  altaplanes  of 
Bogota,  Tunja,  and  Pamplona;  and  thence  to  the  interior  of  Guayana.  A  vague 
rumor  prevailed  throughout  all  these  regions  that  the  sovereign  prince  of  some 
remote  interior  country,  abounding  in  rich  gold  mines,  appeared  on  great  state 
occasions  with  his  body  sprinkled  over  with  glittering  gold  dust;  and  the  term 
El  Dorado  (  "  The  Golden  "  )  was  subsequently  applied  to  a  supposed  country  of 
fabulous  wealth. 

'  All  the  early  chroniclers  and  historians  of  the  New  World,  from  Herrera  to 
Padre  Pedro  Murillo  Velarde,  attribute  to  Spain,  as  the  original  discoverer,  pro- 
prietorship of  the  whole  of  the  Guayanas. 


6 

directly  threatens  the  dismemberment  of  one  of  the  Spanish 
American  republics,  and  indirectly  menaces  the  sovereignty  and 
territorial  integrity  of  at  least  two  others. 

Such  a  controversy,  involving  as  it  does  principles  so  vital  to 
autonomous  government  on  this  continent,  can  hardly  fail  to  deeply 
interest  the  American  people.  Moreover,  since  the  contention  has 
assumed  a  phase  in  open  conflict  with  American  public  law,  and 
with  an  international  status  in  South  America  for  the  maintenance 
of  which  the  United  States  stand  solemnly  pledged,  it  has  ceased 
to  be  a  matter  of  mere  local  concern,  and  has  already  become  a 
grave  international  question.  It  is  worth  while  then,  in  order  to 
a  clear  conception  of  its  merits  and  possible  consequences,  to 
briefly  examine  some  of  the  more  salient  points  in  its  origin  and 
history.  In  undertaking  this  task,  I  am  not  conscious  of  any  mo- 
tives other  than  such  as  ought  to  actuate  an  impartial  friend  of 
both  parties;  but  it  would  be  quite  impossible  to  preserve  this  atti- 
tude without  permitting  the  facts  in  case  their  full  force  of  simple 
statement. 

Venezuela,  as  a  colony  of  Spain,  declared  her  independence  in 
1810 ;  and  nine  years  later  she  united  with  two  other  Spanish  col- 
onies (New  Granada  and  Ecuador)  in  the  formation  of  the  old 
Colombian  federal  Union.  That  Union  was  formally  recognized  as 
an  independent  nation  by  the  United  States  in  1822,  and  afterwards 
by  all  the  powers  of  the  world.  Subsequently,  in  1831,  when  it 
was  dissolved,  Venezuela  became  a  separate  and  independent 
republic,  and  was,  in  due  course,  recognized  in  that  capacity  by 
the  United  States  and  by  all  the  other  power.-^,  including  Spain. 
In  the  treaty  of  recognition  by  Spain,  in  1845,  the  thirteen  prov 
inces  (Guayana  being  one  of  them),  constituting  the  old  colonial 
Captaincy-General  of  Venezuela  in  1810,  were  each,  specifically 
and  by  name,  ceded  to  the  new  republic.^  But  neither  in  this 
treaty  of  recognition,  nor  in  the  fundamental  law  of  either  the  old 
or  the  new  republic,  is  there  any  mention  of  exact  boundary  lines. 
It  is  merely  stated,  in  general  terms,  that  the  boundaries  are  "  the 
same  as  those  which  marked  the  ancient  Viceroyalty  and  Captain- 
cy-General of  New  Granada  and  Venezuela  in  the  year  1810." 

And  there  is  equal  indefiniteness  as  to  boundary  in  the  cession 
of  part  of  Dutch  Guayana  to  England,  by  the  United  Netherlands, 
in  1814.    By  the  treaty  of  that  date,  England  agreed  to  restore  to 

^  Venezuela's  title,  however,  was  perfect  before  this  act  of  specific  cessions.  (See 
infra,  pp.  7,  10,  11.) 


Holland  "  all  the  colonies,  factories,  and  establishments "  that 
were  "in  the  actual  possession"  of  the  latter  "in  1803,"  with  the 
exception  of  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope  and  "the  establishments  of 
Demarara,  Essequibo,  and  Berbice."  These  were  to  be  disposed  of 
by  supplemental  agreement  "  conformable  to  the  mutual  con- 
venience and  interests  of  both  parties."^  And  by  the  terms  of 
that  supplemental  agreement,  the  States-General  ceded  to  England 
"  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope  and  the  establishments  of  Demarara, 
Essequibo,  and  Berbice "  on  the  condition  that  the  Dutch  should 
retain  the  right  freely  to  navigate  and  trade  between  those  places 
and  the  territories  of  the  Netherlands  in  Europe. ^  But  there  is  no 
mention  of  boundaries  of  these  three  settlements  which  constitute 
the  present  British  Guinea. 

Fortunately,  however,  the  extent  of  those  settlements  is  not  a 
matter  of  mere  conjecture  ;  for  their  boundaries  are  very  clearly  in- 
dicated, as  we  shall  see  further  on,  by  an  unbroken  chain  of  his- 
torical and  documentary  evidence  extending  back  over  a  period  of 
more  than  two  centuries. 

II. 

It  is  a  principle  now  universally  accepted  that  "  when  a  Euro- 
pean colony  in  America  becomes  indpendent,  it  succeeds  to  the 
territorial  limits  of  the  colony  as  it  stood  in  the  hands  of  the  parent 
country."  The  United  States  have  always  successfully  maintained 
this  principle.  They  have  always  maintained,  as  other  nations 
have  maintained,  that  discovery  gave  an  exclusive  right  to  extin- 
guish, whether  by  purchase  or  by  conquest,  the  Indian  title  of 
occupancy.  And  they  have  as  consistently  and  successfully  main- 
tained that  their  title  to  Indian  territory  was  not  contingent  upon 
any  act  of  specific  cession  by  the  parent  country ;  but  that  the  treaty 
of  1783  was  merely  a  recognition  of  pre-existing  right  of  domain? 
and  that  "  the  soil  and  sovereignty  within  the  acknowledged  limits 
of  the  thirteen  colonies  were  as  much  theirs  at  the  time  of  the 
Declaration  of  Independence  as  at  any  subsequent  period."' 

Now  that  the  whole  of  the  Guayanese  territory  north  of  the  Por- 
tuguese possessions  originally  belonged  to  Spain,  in  virtue  of  her 
right  as  the  first  discoverer,  hardly  admits  of  doubt.     A  Spanish 

1  Art.  I.    Tr.  of  London,  Aug.  18, 1814. 
'  See  art.  I.,  Supplemental  Treaty,  Aug.  13,  1814. 

» Wharton's  Digest  Int.  Law,  vol.  I.,  section  6;  Wheaton'g  Elements  Int.  Law,  Ed. 
1868,  sec.  6,  and  notes;  Wheat.  Keps.  XII.,  p.  527. 


subject,  Don  Alonzo  de  Ojeda,  sailing  under  royal  commission,  was 
the  first  discoverer  in  1499.  ^  In  1500,  Don  Vicente  Yauez  Pin- 
zon,  another  Spanish  subject,  was  the  first  to  explore  the  delta  of 
the  Orinoco.^  In  1531,  Don  Deigo  de  Ordaz,  another  Spanish  sub- 
ject, was  the  first  to  explore  the  Orinoco  river,  which  he  ascended 
as  far  as  the  mouth  of  the  Meta,  Subsequently  the  coast  between 
the  mouth  of  the  Orinoco  and  Essequibo  rivers,  and  the  Orinoco 
valley  as  far  up  as  the  site  of  the  present  city  of  Bolivar,  were  par- 
tially colonized  by  Spanish  subjects,  who  likewise  established  Chris- 
tian missions  among  the  aboriginal  tribes  in  the  remote  interior.' 
These  are  familiar  facts  of  history.  And  it  is  a  principle,  sanc- 
tioned by  usage  and  consistently  maintained  by  both  England  and 
the  United  States,  that  "continuity  furnishes  a  just  foundation  for 
a  claim  of  territory  in  connection  with  those  of  discovery  and 
occupation."  That  is  to  say,  the  discovering  nation  is  not  limited 
in  its  claim  to  the  particular  spot  discovered  or  occupied.  Thus, 
in  the  case  of  an  island,  the  discovery  or  occupancy  of  a  part  in- 
cludes the  whole;  in  the  case  of  a  river,  the  discovery  or  occupancy 
of  its  channels  and  banks  extends  to  the  entire  region  drained  by 
it.  But  if  this  principle  be  admitted,  as  it  must,  then  it  clearly 
establishes  Spain's  original,  rightful  claim,  not  only  to  all  the 
Guayanas  drained  by  the  Orinoco  and  its  tributaries,  but  to  the 
whole  of  what  is  now  British  Guinea. 

But  some  years  after  this  discovery  and  exploration  of  the  Guay- 
anas by  Spain,  the  Dutch  obtained  a  foothold  on  the  Atlantic  coast 
east  of  the  Essequibo  river,  and  established  trading  posts  on  the 
Surenam  and  Demarara  rivers.*  It  is  true,  that  at  that  time,  the 
independence  of  the  Netherlands,  though  recognized  by  other  pow- 


H)jeda  skirted  the  entire  coast  of  the  Guayanas,  landing  at  several  places.  (Dal- 
ton's  Hist.  Guiana,  vol.  I.,  p.  91 ;  Robertson's  America  II.,  p.  154.) 

Columbus  discovered,  but  did  not  explore  the  Orinoco.  Encountering  much 
difficulty  in  entering  the  mouth  cf  the  great  river,  he  sailed  westward  and  landed 
on  the  continent  at  several  places,  (liobertsoii's  America,  II.,  Dalton's  Hist. 
Brit  Guiana,  Ed.  1855), 

'See  Gumilla's  Atlas  of  1740;  Bretano's  map  of  the  Orinoco  Valloy  of  1751 ;  the 
treaty  between  Spain  and  Portugal  of  1750,  by  which  Spanish  Guayana  is  de- 
scribed as  extending  from  the  Maranon  (or  Amazon)  river  to  the  margins  of  the 
Orinoco,  and  thence  eastward  and  northward  to  the  Atlantic  ocean. 

*Reynal,  "Hist.  Indies,"  1820.  The  Dutch  never  had  any  permanent  settlements 
west  of  the  Essequibo.  They  made  frequent  attempts  to  occupy  the  country  be- 
tween the  Essequibo  and  the  Pumaron,  but  were  always  dislodged  and  driven  out 
by  the  Spaniards.     (See  Dalton's  Hist.  British  Guinea,  p.  182,  et  sequens. 


ers,  had  not  been  acknowledged  by  Spain ;  and  Holland,  as  a  de- 
pendency of  Spain,  could  not  acquire  this  territory  in  her  own 
right.  But  by  the  treaty  of  peace  and  recognition  of  1648,  usually 
referred  to  as  the  "treaty  of  Munster,"^  each  of  the  parties  (Spain 
and  Holland)  were  to  remain  in  possession  of  the  countries  then 
in  actual  possession  of  each  in  America  and  in  the  West  Indies. 
This  gave  to  the  Dutch  legal  title  to  their  de  facto  possessions  in 
Guayana ;  but  it  likewise  prohibited,  by  necessary  implication,  any 
extension  of  their  settlements. 

Again,  by  the  treaty  of  Utrecht,  of  1713,  England  agreed  to 
"  aid  the  Spaniards  to  recover  their  ancient  dominions  in  America," 
the  limits  of  which  were  stated  to  be  the  "  same  as  those  in  the 
time  of  Charles  the  Second  ";2  and  it  is  a  fact  of  history,  quite  easy 
of  verification,  that,  "  in  the  time  of  Charles  the  Second"  (1661- 
1700)  Spain  claimed  and  held  possession  of  all  the  Guayanese  ter- 
ritory west  and  south  of  the  Essequibo  river.  ^ 

Again,  by  the  treaty  of  Aranjuez,  of  1791,  between  Spain  and 
Holland,  each  of  the  high  contracting  parties  obligated  itself  to  the 
other  to  return  any  fugitive  negro  slaves  of  the  one  that  might  be 
'  *  found  within  the  territories  and  settlements  of  the  other " ;  and 
the  limits  of  their  respective  "territories  and  settlements"  are  very 
clearly  indicated  by  the  clause  which  provided  for  an  exchange  of 
fugitives  "  between  Puerto  Rico  and  San  Eustaquio,  Coro  and  Cu- 
racao, the  Spanish  settlements  on  the  Essequibo  and  the  Dutch  set- 
tlements of  Demarara  and  Berbice."*  Thus,  according  to  the  maps 
of  the  country  in  use  at  the  time,  Spanish  Puerto  Rico  was  oppo- 


^Otherwise  called  the  Peace  of  Westphalia,  signed  at  Munster,  Oct.  24,  1648 
whereby  the  independence  of  the  United  Dutch  Provinces  was  recognized  by 
Spain.    (See  art.  V.  of  the  Treaty.) 

'Art.  VIII.,  Treaty  of  Utrecht,  July  13, 1713. 

'Depon's,  Voyages,  etc.,  vol.  III.,  p.  333 ;  Noire,  the  English  geographer,  "Works, 
published  in  1828;  Baron  Humboldt,  Voy.  Equinoctial  Regions,  vol.  IV.,  p.  218. 
Noire,  the  English  authority  above  cited,  says :  "  British  Guiana  extends  from  the 
Corentin  to  the  Essequibo.  This  is  the  rightful  extent  of  the  colony,  as  deter- 
mined by  the  Treaty  of  Munster  of  1648,  which  has  never  been  abrogated."  The 
attempt  by  the  Dutch  to  extend  their  settlements  westward  to  the  Pumaron  was,  he 
says,  "in  violation  of  treaty  stipulations."  .  .  .  "  In  reality, "  he  continues, 
"the  entire  coast  country  from  the  Orinoco  to  the  Essequibo  constitutes  what 
should  be  called  Spanish  or  Colombian  (now  Venezuelan)  Guayana." 

^Treaty  of  Aranjuez,  June  23,  1791,  art.  I.  This  treaty  antedates  the  first  Dutch 
encroachments  west  and  south  of  the  Essequibo.  (See  Sir  Henry  Bolingbroke's 
"  Voyage  to  Demarara,"  published  in  London  in  1813.) 


10 

site  Dutch  San  Eustaquio,  Spanish  Coro  over  against  Dutch  Cura- 
cao, while  the  Spanish  settlements  and  trading-posts  on  the  west 
side  of  the  Essequibo  were  directly  opposite  those  of  the  Dutch  on 
the  other  side  of  the  river.  The  inference  is  therefore  an  almost 
necessary  one  that  the  center  of  the  channel  of  the  Essequibo  was 
the  recognized  boundary  line  between  Spanish  and  Dutch  Guayana. 

It  is  true  that,  subsequent  to  the  date  of  this  treaty,  the  Dutch 
did  make  encroachments  upon  the  territory  west  of  the  Essequibo; 
but  all  the  chroniclers  of  the  times  agree  that  the  intruders  were 
promptly  driven  back  to  their  own  side  of  the  river  by  the  Span- 
iards. And  even  if  they  had  not  been,  there  was  not  sufficient  time 
in  the  twenty-three  years  from  1791  (the  date  of  the  treaty  of  Aran- 
juez)  to  1814  (when  the  Dutch  ceded  the  country  to  England)  to 
give  color  of  title  by  prescription.  Title  by  prescription,  to  be 
valid,  must  be  from  time  immemorial;  and  the  occupancy  must 
have  been  undisputed  and  peaceable — conditions  which  were  to- 
tally wanting  in  the  present  case. 

Not  only  is  the  Essequibo  clearly  indicated  as  the  dividing  line 
by  the  treaty  of  1791,  but  no  less  clearly  so  by  historical  events 
which  preceded  and  led  up  to  it.  Thus,  in  1780,  the  Spanish  gov- 
ernment directed  the  Governor-General  of  Venezuela  to  establish 
rules  and  regulations  for  peopling  and  governing  the  province  of 
Guayana  between  the  Essequibo  and  Orinoco  rivers.  This  royal 
decree  recited  the  fact  that,  although  the  Dutch  had  "extended 
themselves  westward  to  the  Essequibo,"  there  were  "  no  Dutch  set- 
tlements on  the  river  remote  from  the  seacoast";  that  westward 
from  the  Essequibo  and  southward  from  the  Atlantic  was  "  a  vast 
and  fertile  region  occupied  by  Indian  tribes,^  and  by  fugitive  ne- 
gro slaves  from  the  Dutch  settlements  " ;  that  this  valuable  domain 
belonged  to  Spain  by  right  of  original  discovery;  and  that  as  it  had 
"  never  been  ceded  to  or  occupied  by  any  European  power,"  it  ought 
to  be  colonized  and  governed  in  the  name  of  the  Spanish  monarch. 

Furthermore,  in  accordance  with  the  purposes  of  this  decree,  Don 
Jos^  Felipe  de  Inciarte  was  commissioned  to  investigate  and  report 
upon  the  condition  and  extent  of  the  Dutch  encroachments  in 
Guayana.  In  due  time  he  reported  that  the  Dutch  had  "  an  insig- 
nificant trading-post,"  apparently  of  a  temporary  character,  on  the 
coast  between  the  Essequibo  and  Moroco  rivers.     He  recommended 


'There  were  as  many  as  fourteen  distinct  tribes  between  the  Essequibo  and  Ori- 
noco rivers  and  between  the  Atlantic  coast  and  the  Brazilian  border.  (See  Brett's 
"  Indian  Tribes  of  Guiana,"  published  in  London  in  1868.) 


11 

their  immediate  expulsion  and  the  establishment  of  Spanish 
forts  in  the  vicinity.  In  a  subsequent  dispatch,  dated  December  5, 
1783,  he  reported  that  the  Dutch  had  "  alread}--  abandoned  their 
posts  near  the  mouth  of  the  Moroco."  It  does  not  appear  whether 
these  abandoned  posts  were  destroyed  or  occupied  by  the  Spaniards. 
Nor  is  that  essential  to  the  merits  of  the  case.  The  formal  remon- 
Btrance  by  Spain,  and  the  subsequent  withdrawal  of  the  Dutch, 
destroyed  all  color  of  title  by  prescription.  ^ 

It  is  quite  manifest,  then,  that  Great  Britain  could  not  have  de- 
rived title  to  her  present  holdings  west  of  the  Essequibo  from  the 
Dutch  by  the  treaty  of  1814.  Nor  can  she  justify  her  bold  and  per- 
sistent aggressions  westward  to  the  margin  of  the  Orinoco  on  the 
"  plea  that  any  portion  of  the  country  was  ever  in  the  peaceable  pos- 
session of  the  Dutch. 

III. 

Still  more  untenable  is  England's  claim  to  this  territory  on  the 
ground  of  her  alleged  treaties  with  some  native  Indian  tribes.  Such 
a  pretension  may  be  said,  without  discourtesy,  to  be  simply  absurd. 
On  the  discovery  of  the  American  continent,  the  principle  adopted 
by  European  nations,  in  order  to  avoid  conflicting  settlements  and 
•consequent  wars,  was  that  discovery  gave  title  to  the  government 
by  whose  subjects  or  by  whose  authority  it  was  made.  The  title 
thus  acquired  was  good  as  against  all  other  European  governments, 
and  might  be  consummated  at  any  time  by  actual  possession.  It 
gave  to  the  nation  making  the  discovery  the  sole  right  of  acquiring 
the  soil  from  the  natives,  and  of  establishing  settlements  thereon. 
This  was  a  right  which  all  European  nations  asserted  for  them- 
selves, and  to  the  assertion  of  which  all  assented.  Whatever  may 
have  been  the  rights  of  the  native  Indian  occupants,  the  discover- 
ing nation  claimed  and  exercised  ultimate  dominion  over  the  soil 
while  it  was  in  their  possession ;  and  it  claimed  and  exercised  the 
right  to  grant  and  convey  the  lands,  subject  only  to  Indian  occu- 
pancy, and  such  grants  have  been  uniformly  held  to  be  valid.  It 
is  no  argument  to  say  that  the  opinion  of  mankind  has  changed  on 
this  point  with  the  progress  of  civilization ;  for  if  the  truth  of  the 
assertion  be  granted,  it  would  not  afifect  vested  rights  previously 


^As  a  matter  of  fact,  however,  the  Dutch  never  had  any  fixed  settlements  west 
■of  the  Essequibo.  They  made  predatory  raids  as  far  as  the  Moroco,  and  even  be- 
jond,  but  were  in  each  case  driven  away  by  the  Spaniards.  (See  "  Hist.  Nueve 
Andalucia,"  by  Caulin.) 


12 

acquired  by  the  general  consent  of  the  civilized  world.  The  right 
of  nations  to  countries  discovered  in  the  sixteenth  century  is  deter- 
mined, not  by  the  improved  and  more  enlightened  opinion  of  the 
world  three  and  a  half  centuries  later,  but  by  the  law  of  nations  aa 
it  was  then  understood  and  universally  recognized.  This  is  a  prin- 
ciple so  fundamental,  and  so  firmly  established  by  usage,  that  it  is- 
no  longer  a  matter  for  discussion. 

Nor  did  the  successful  revolt  of  1810  affect  the  title  which  Vene- 
zuela, by  that  act,  derived  from  Spain.  It  is  a  principle  of  universal 
application  that  when  a  colony  is  in  revolt,  and  before  its  inde- 
pendence has  been  acknowledged  by  the  parent  country,  the 
colonial  territory  belongs,  in  the  sense  of  revolutionary  right,  to 
the  former,  and  in  the  sense  of  legitimate  right,  to  the  latter.  "  It- 
would  be  monstrous,"  wrote  Mr.  Secretary  Marcy  in  1856,  "to 
contend  that,  in  such  a  contingency,  the  colonial  territory  is  to  be 
treated  as  derelict,  and  subject  to  voluntary  acquisition  by  a  third 
nation.  The  idea  would  be  abhorrent  to  all  the  notions  of  right 
which  constitute  the  international  code  of  Europe  and  America."^ 
And  yet,  astonishing  as  it  may  seem,  the  assumption  that,  pending^ 
a  war  of  colonial  revolution,  all  territorial  rights  of  both  parties  to- 
the  contest  become  extinguished,  and  the  colonial  territory  open 
to  seizure  by  anybody,  is  sometimes  made  the  only  foundation  for 
England's  pretension  of  right  to  territory  in  South  America! 

Equally  absurd  is  the  contention  that  "  Venezuela  forfeited  any 
color  of  title  she  may  have  had"  to  that  territory  "by  her  failure 
to  occupy  it";  for  this  would  be  about  equivalent  to  saying  that  a 
nation  forfeits  legal  title  to  her  unoccupied  territory  whenever  she 
is  physically  unable  to  prevent  its  forcible  seizure  by  a  stronger 
power.  Such  a  proposition  is  contrary  to  the  most  elementary 
principles  of  public  law.  "Everything  included  in  the  country 
pertains  to  the  nation,"  says  Vattel,  "  hence  nobody  but  the  nation^ 
or  its  legal  representative,  is  authorized  to  dispose  of  such  things." 
And  then,  as  if  prescient  of  this  very  question  in  Guayana,  the 
same  eminent  author  continues:  "If  there  be  kept  uncultivated 
and  desert  places,  nobody  has  a  right  to  take  possession  of  them 
without  the  consent  of  the  nation.  Although  the  nation  makes  no 
actual  use  of  its  desert  places,  they  nevertheless  belong  to  it.    It 


^  Mr,  Marcy,  Secretary  of  State,  Instructions  to  Mr.  Dallas,  U.  S.  Minister  ia 
England,  July  26,  1856.    See  also  Wharton's  Dig.,  vol.  I.,  sec.  7. 


13 

has  interests  in  preserving  them  for  future  use,  and  is  not  responsi- 
ble to  any  person  for  the  manner  in  which  it  makes  use  of  its 
property."^ 

Furthermore,  in  the  Guayanas,  no  less  than  in  other  parts  of  the 
American  continent,  the  right  of  discovery  and  conquest  had  been 
already  exhausted  in  1814,  when  the  Dutch  ceded  their  possessions 
in  Guayana  to  Great  Britain,  There  was  no  longer  any  territory 
open,  to  conquest  by  European  powers.  For  what  subsequently  b^ 
■came  known  as  the  Monroe  Doctrine  had  a  much  earlier  origin 
than  the  formal  declaration  of  1823.  The  principles  then  enunci- 
ated were  not  new.  They  had  been  coeval  with  the  very  existence 
of  the  United  States  government. ^  They  were  the  logical  sequence 
of  the  Declaration  of  Independence,  and  of  the  treaty  of  Ghent 
which  followed.  They  were  necessarily  incident  to  the  character 
of  American  institutions,  were  clearly  foreshadowed  in  the  policy 
of  Washington's  first  administration,  and  distinctly  outlined  in  his 
Farewell  Address  to  the  people  of  the  United  States.  And  they 
were  subsequently  repeated  and  emphasized  by  John  Quincy 
Adams,  as  Secretary  of  State,  in  his  official  conferences  and  proto- 
cols with  the  Russian  Ambassador,  Baron  Tuyl.  So  that  President 
Monroe  merely  formulated,  in  a  timely  message  to  Congress,  an 
unwritten  law  of  a  fundamental  character  which  had  already  be- 
come as  sacred  to  the  American  people  as  the  Constitution  itself. 
European  colonies  already  established  and  recognized,  were  not  to 
be  interfered  with.  But  "no  new  colonies"  were  to  be  established 
or  recognized.  Nor  was  there  to  be  "any  extension  of  existing 
colonial  systems";  and,  above  all,  "no  interposition  by  European 
powers  in  the  affairs  of  the  Spanish  American  Republics."' 

•Book  II.,  chap.  VII.,  sec,  86. 

^Tucker's  Monroe  Doctrine,  pp.  12,  14,  21,  40,  111,  &c.;  Adams's  Memoirs,  163. 

'Tucker's  Monroe  Doct.  pp.  17-20;  Whart.  Dig.  sec.  57;  President  Monroe's 
annual  messages,  Dec.  2,  1823,  and  Dec.  7,  1824;  Adams's  Diary  VI.,  163;  Pres- 
ident Polk's  annual  messages,  1845-48. 

Under  the  Monroe  administration,  it  was  asserted  "  as  a  principle,  in  which  the 
rights  and  interests  of  the  United  States  are  involved,  that  the  American  conti- 
nents, by  the  free  and  independent  condition  which  they  have  assumed  and  main- 
tained, are  henceforth  not  to  be  considered  as  subjects  for  future  colonization  by  any 
European  power  "  ;  and  that  "  we  owe  it  to  candor  "  to  declare  that  "  any  attempt " 
on  the  part  of  European  powers  "to  extend  their  system  to  any  portion  of  this 
hemisphere  would  be  considered  as  dangerous  to  our  peace  and  safety."  That 
"  with  the  existing  colonies  or  dependencies  of  any  European  power,  we  have  not 
interfered  and  shall  not  interfere";  but  with  respect  to  "Governments  who 
have  declared  their  independence  and  maintained  it,  .  .  we  could  not  view 
any  interposition  for  the  purpose  of  oppressing  them,  or  controlling  in  any  manner 
their  destiny,  by  any  European  power,  in  any  other  light  than  as  the  manifestation 
of  an  unfriendly  disposition  towards  the  United  States." 


14 

There  was  no  mistaking  the  plain  and  emphatic  terms  of  this- 
inhibition.  It  clearly  extended  to  all  possible  treaties  or  compacts 
with  native  Indian  occupants,  whereby  new  European  colonies 
might  be  set  up  on  this  continent.  It  clearly  comprehended  all 
such  treaties  and  compacts,  real  or  pretended,  whereby  the  area  of 
existing  Europern  colonies  might  be  enlarged.  And  it  quite  a» 
clearly  embraced  all  possible  aggressions  and  usurpations  whereby 
the  territorial  area  and  domain  of  existing  European  colonies  might 
be  augmented  by  mere  de  facto  occupancy. 

It  has  been  said  that  the  principles  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  were 
departed  from,  if  not  partially  abandoned,  in  the  unfortunate  con- 
vention of  1850,  usually  known  as  the  "  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty."" 
That  compact  is  an  admitted  blunder;  but  it  will  bear  no  such 
construction  as  this.  Neither  Mr.  Clayton  nor  the  President,  nor 
the  slender  majority  of  senators  who  ratified  that  treaty,  ever  gave 
it  that  construction.  The  most  that  can  be  said,  is  that  they  were 
misled  and  deceived  by  statements  officially  made  by  the  British 
minister,  which  his  government  afterwards  disclaimed ;  and  that 
they  were  thus  entrapped  into  a  mere  constructive  recognition  of 
the  British  status  quo  ante  in  Central  America.  And  they  were  the 
more  easily  led  into  this  mistake  by  an  intense  desire  to  stimulate 
a  great  international  enterprise  at  a  time  when  the  capital  necessary 
to  the  success  of  such  enterprises  was  difficult  to  obtain.  Moreoverr 
the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  if  ever  a  legal  compact,  has  been  practi- 
cally a  dead  letter  since  1881-2.  But  even  if  this  were  not  the  case, 
and  the  treaty  were  legal  and  in  full  force,  it  would,  by  its  very 
terms,  efiectually  debar  Great  Britain  from  her  present  de  facto  pos- 
sessions in  Guayana  west  of  the  Moroco  riyer. 

Again,  it  has  been  said  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  has  no  legal  va- 
lidity for  lack  of  formal  legislative  sanction.  Such  an  opinion 
merits  very  little  consideration.  In  the  first  place,  every  resolution 
on  the  subject  introduced  into  either  House  of  Congress  has  been 
in  unqualified  support  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine — not  one  of  which 
was  ever  rejected.  That  of  1824,  by  Mr.  Clay,  never  came  to  a  vote. 
That  of  1879,  by  Mr.  Burnside,  was  merely  referred  to  the  appropri- 
ate committee,  which  failed  to  report  before  the  close  of  the  session. 
That  of  1880,  by  Mr.  Crapo,  was  unanimously  and  cordially  sus- 
tained by  the  Foreign  Afiairs  committee,  but  the  session  closed  before 
the  resolution  could  be  taken  up.  In  the  second  place,  express 
legislative  sanction  has  never  been  deemed  necessary  to  the  validity 
of  the  Monroe  declaration.    Every  one  knows  that  most  of  the  rules 


15 

of  international  law  impose  obligations  derivable  from  precedent 
alone,  and  that  as  a  precedent  the  Monroe  declaration  of  1823  has 
been  universally  acknowledged  and  accepted.  It  has  been  confirmed 
by  every  subsequent  President  of  the  United  States,  and  by  every 
chief  Executive  of  every  South  America  republic,  who  has  ever  had 
occasion  to  refer  to  it ;  and  it  has  been  persistently  reiterated  and 
upheld  by  publicists  and  statesmen  of  all  political  parties  in  both 
the  Americas.^  Finally,  to  say  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  has  no 
validity  for  want  of  express  legislative  sanction  is  to  assume  that 
President  Washington's  Farewell  Address  has  none,  for  neither  has 
that  ever  received  any  express  legislative  sanction ;  and  yet  every 
one  knows  that  that  Address  has  shaped  the  foreign  policy  of  the 
United  States  for  nearly  a  whole  century. 


IV. 

It  is  never  a  grateful  duty  to  review,  however  dispassionately 
and  impartially,  a  long  and  aggravated  series  of  aggressions  by  the 
strong  against  the  weak;  and  in  the  present  case  it  is  sincerely 
wished  so  unpleasant  a  task  might  be  omitted  entirely.  But  any 
account  of  the  origin  and  history  of  this  Guayana  boundary  dispute 
would  be  lamentably  incomplete  and  defective  without  a  brief  re- 
view of  the  unsuccessful  efforts  that  have  been  made  to  end  it ;  and 
this  necessarily  accentuates  a  policy  which,  I  regret  to  say,  has  too 
often  characterized  England's  dealings  with  weaker  powers. 

A  few  years  after  the  cession  of  1814,  some  British  traders  estab- 
lished outposts  near  the  Atlantic  coast  west  of  the  Essequibo  ;  and 


^The  House  Resolution  of  1826,  on  the  subject  of  the  Panama  Conference,  con- 
stitutes no  exception.  That  Resolution  merely  expressed  the  opinion  that  the  U.  S. 
ought  not  to  be  represented  in  the  proposed  conference  "  except  in  a  diplomatic 
character";  that  the  U.  S.  "ought  not  to  form  any  alliance"  with  the  South 
American  republics,  but  "be  left  free  to  act,  in  any  crisis,  in  such  manner"  as  our 
"  feelings  and  honor  might  dictate."  It  is  easy  to  see  the  motive  which  prompted 
this  Resolution,  and  why  that  Conference  failed.  One  of  the  questions  proposed 
for  its  discussion  was  "  the  consideration  of  the  means  to  be  adopted  for  the  entire 
abolition  of  the  African  slave  trade."  Cuba  and  Porto  Rico,  still  slaveholding  prov- 
inces of  Spain,  would  have  been  involved  in  the  discussion ;  Hayti,  already  a  new 
republic,  would  have  claimed  the  right  of  representation ;  and  there  were  then 
about  4,000,000  negro  slaves  in  the  Southern  State  of  the  United  States !  Thus  the 
necessity  which  then  existed  of  preserving  an  institution  under  our  federal  Con- 
stitution, lost  to  us  the  opportunity  of  giving  permanent  direction  to  the  political 
and  commercial  connections  of  the  newly  enfranchised  Spanish  American  States. 


16 

as  early  as  January,  1822,  a  British  settlement  had  sprung  up  as  far 
westward  as  the  mouth  of  the  Pumaron  river.  But  at  that  time  the 
old  Colombian  Union  was  too  much  occupied  with  internal  strifes 
to  pay  much  attention  to  foreign  affairs,  and  this  first  of  a  long 
series  of  aggressions  was  met  only  by  a  formal  remonstrance  which 
seems  to  have  been  totally  disregarded.^ 

The  next  ofiicial  reference  to  the  subject  was  in  1840.  Vene- 
zuela, which  had  been  an  independent  Republic  for  about  nine  years, 
now  earnestly  remonstrated  against  these  encroachments,  and 
claimed  the  Essequibo  river  as  the  rightful  boundary.  No  imme- 
diate attention  was  paid  to  this.  But  soon  afterwards,  the  British 
representative  at  Caracas  gave  notice  that  Sir  Robert  Schomburgk 
had  been  commissioned  to  "  survey  and  mark  out  the  boundaries 
of  British  Guayana."  The  assent  and  concurrence  of  Venezuela 
was  not  asked. 

A  few  months  later,  when  there  had  been  some  informal  confer- 
ences on  the  subject,  the  British  representative  informed  the  Ven- 
ezuelan minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  that  the  'Demarara  colonial 
government  had  been  instructed  from  London  to  resist,  by  force  if 
necessary,  any  aggressions  on  the  frontier  territories  occupied  by 
independent  tribes  of  Indians. 

Realizing  her  utter  inability  to  wage  a  successful  war  with  so 
powerful  a  nation,  Venezuela  proposed  some  conventional  agree- 
ment as  to  boundary.  This  proposition  seems  to  have  been  treated 
with  indifference.  At  any  rate,  Schomburgk  went  on  with  the  sur- 
vey, and  finally  completed  and  staked  off  the  line  which  bears  his 
name. 

That  line  may  be  briefly  described  as  follows:  Beginning  on 
the  Essequibo  river,  some  five  degrees  due  south  from  its  mouth, 
it  proceeds  to  the  river  Maju,  which  it  crosses  near  the  fourth 
parallel ;  it  thence  deviates  southwestward  to  mount  Roraima,  and 
crosses  the  Mazaruni  river  near  its  headwaters,  some  two  degrees 


'  There  can  bo  no  doubt  whatever  that  England's  extreme  pretension  then  ex- 
tended no  farther  than  the  right  banks  of  the  Pumaron  river.  Her  subsequent 
advance  to  the  mouth  of  the  Moroco  seems  to  have  been  an  afterthought.  The 
"  London  Atlas  of  Universal  Geography,"  even  in  as  late  an  edition  as  that  of 
1842  (two  years  after  the  "Schomburgk  line"  had  been  run),  represents  the  ex- 
treme western  boundary  of  British  Guinea  to  be  the  Pumaron  river,  and  the  area 
between  that  river  and  the  Essequibo  as  "territory  claimed  by  Venezuela."  (See 
also  Broddam-Wheatham's  "  Roraima  and  British  Guinea,"  pp.  204  and  205;  also 
Instructions  by  the  Colombian  government  to  its  ministers  at  London,  issued  in 
1822. 


17 

due  west  from  the  banks  of  the  Essequibo  at  its  nearest  point;  it 
then  deflects  a  little  to  the  northward,  and  crossing  the  great  Cuyuni 
river,  passes  southward  near  the  headwaters  of  the  Barima,  and 
thence  to  the  mouth  of  the  Amacura  above  the  delta  of  the  Ori- 
noco— thus  allotting  to  Great  Britain  not  only  the  entire  Atlantic 
coast  between  the  Essequibo  and  the  Orinoco,  but  also  a  large  sec- 
tion of  country  in  the  interior.^ 

In  January,  1842,  when  more  moderate  counsels  prevailed,  the 
British  government  very  distinctly  disclaimed  any  intention  to 
occupy  this  territory,  or  to  claim  the  "Schomburgk  line"  as  a  possi- 
ble boundary.  Lord  Aberdeen  explained  to  the  Venezuelan  envoy, 
Dr.  Fortique,  that  "  the  so-called  Schomburgk  line  "  was  never  de- 
signed to  be  other  than  "  merely  tentative,"  or  "for  convenience  in 
future  negotiations  "  ;  and  as  an  evidence  of  his  sincerety  he  ofl5- 
cially  disclaimed  the  Schomburgk  line,  and  ordered  its  obliteration 
by  the  Demara  authorities.  This  clearly  re-established  the  statvbs  quo 
ante,  and  limited  the  disputed  territory  to  the  narrow  strip  between 
the  Essequibo  and  Moroco  rivers.  Subsequently,  he  proposed  a 
conventional  boundary  line,  as  follows :  Beginning  at  the  mouth 
of  the  Moroco  river  and  running  southward  in  general  direction  to 
the  junction  of  the  Barama  and  Aunama  rivers  ;  thence  southeast- 
ward to  the  Cuyuni ;  thence  along  the  western  margin  of  the  last 
named  river  to  where  it  receives  the  waters  of  the  Yuruari ;  thence 
eastward,  following  the  general  direction  of  the  Cuyuni,  to  its 
source  near  Roraima ;  and  thence  in  general  course  due  eastward  to 
the  headwaters  of  the  Essequibo.  ^ 

This  proposition,  though  very  disadvantageous  to  Venezuela,  in 
that  it  would  have  deprived  her  of  an  immense  territory  which 
rightfully  belonged  to  her,  would,  in  all  probability,  have  been 
accepted  as  a  compromise  had  it  been  made  in  a  different  spirit  and 
without  humiliating  conditions.  But,  in  submitting  it,  Lord  Ab- 
erdeen said  his  government  was  "  disposed  to  cede  to  Venezuela  " 
the  territory  beyond  the  line  indicated,  "  on  the  condition  that 
Venezuela  would  enter  into  an  obligation  not  to  alienate  any  por- 
tion of  it  to  a  third  party " ;  and  on  the  further  condition  that 

1  This  was  the  original  "  Schomburgk  line."  It  has  since  been  extended  to  suit 
British  convenience.  Thus,  according  to  the  official  publications  of  the  London 
Geographical  Society,  the  difference  between  the  "  Schomburgk  line  "  as  it  stood 
in  1875,  and  as  it  stood  in  1895,  is  about  seventy  miles,  involving  a  difference  in 
area  of  about  ten  thousand  square  miles  I 

'See  map  herewith,  p.  23. 


18 

"  the  Indian  tribes  therein  be  not  oppressed  or  maltreated  by  the 
Venezuelan  authorities.  As  this  involved  "  an  acknowledgment 
of  territorial  rights  in  Guayana  which  Great  Britain  did  not  pos- 
sess, 'and  contained  besides  a  restriction  derogatory  to  the  sover- 
eignty of  the  Republic,"  it  had  to  be  rejected.^ 

Negotiations  were,  however,  continued  until  the  sudden  death  of 
the  Venezuelan  envoy.  Dr.  Fortique,  when  they  were  resumed  at 
Caracas.  The  final  result  was  the  Diplomatic  Agreement  of  1850, 
by  which  each  party  was  obligated  "  not  to  occupy  any  part  of  the 
unoccupied  territory  in  dispute  "  till  the  question  of  boundaries 
should  be  definitely  settled. 

Where  then,  was  this  "  unoccupied  territory  in  dispute  "?  The 
question  is  an  important  one  in  view  of  events  which  followed. 
That  Venezuela  understood  it  to  be  limited  to  the  area  between 
the  Moroco  and  Essequibo,  hardly  admits  of  a  rational  doubt ;  and 
there  is  very  little  doubt  that  the  British  government  understood 
the  Agreement  in  a  like  sense.  However,  some  years  later,  under 
change  of  government,  each  party  accused  the  other  of  trespass, 
and  of  thus  violating  the  Agreement  of  1850. 

Thus  the  matter  stood  in  May,  1879,  when  Dr.  Rojas,  the  Ven- 
ezuelan minister  at  London,  addressed  a  note  to  Lord  Salisbury 
urging  some  pacific  termination  of  the  question  of  boundary,  inti- 
mating a  willingness  to  accept  any  compromise  line  consistent 
with  reason  and  justice,  and  requesting  the  submission  of  some 
proposition  for  final  settlement. 

After  a  delay  of  nearly  eight  months,  Lord  Salisbury  replied,  in 
a  note  dated  January  10,  1880,  that,  as  any  discussion  of  the  legal 
aspects  of  the  question  would  not  be  likely  to  have  satisfactory 
results,  he  preferred  the  alternative  of  compromise  settlement.  He 
said  that  England  claimed,  "  in  virtue  of  ancient  treaties  with  the 
aboriginal  tribes,"  and  of  "  subsequent  concessions  from  Holland," 
all  the  territory  on  the  coast  between  the  mouths  of  the  Essequibo 
and  Orinoco  rivers  ;  and  all  the  territory  of  the  interior  north  and 
east  of  a  line  from  Point  Barima  to  the  mountains  of  Imataca,  and 
thence  to  the  table-lands  of  Santa  Maria,  the  Coroni  river,  and  the 
mountains  of  Roraima  and  Pacaraima!  That  is  to  say,  he  claimed 
not  only  all  the  territory  within  the  original  "  Schomburgk  line," 

^  But  even  these  conditions  might  have  been  accepted  but  for  the  fact  that  the 
British  government  refused  to  make  the  obligations  mutual.  (See  "Brit.  Bounda- 
ries of  Guayana,"  by  Dr.  R.  F,  Seijas,  pp.  170,  176;  also  OflSicial  Memorandum  by 
Dr.  Rafael  Seijas,  of  July  15,  1882.) 


19 

so  distinctly  disclaimed  by  Lord  Aberdeen,  but  a  vast  and  fertile 
region  far  beyond  it.  Referring  to  Venezuela's  claim  that  the  Esse- 
quibo  river  was  the  ancient  boundary  between  the  Dutch  and  Span- 
ish possessions,  he  said  Great  Britain  already  had  some  forty 
thousand  subjects  living  west  of  that  river,  and  that  it  could  not 
be  considered  as  a  possible  boundary;  but  that  he  would  consider 
any  feasible  proposition  of  compromise  that  might  be  submitted 
by  the  Venezuelan  government.^ 

Dr.  Rojas  replied,  April  12th,  that  he  was  authorized  to  waive 
the  question  of  strict  legal  right,  and  to  adjust  the  dispute  on  some 
basis  of  compromise.  He  therefore  inquired  whether  the  British 
government  was  then  disposed,  as  it  has  been  as  late  as  1844,  to 
accept  the  Moroco  river  as  a  conventional  boundary  line. 

Lord  Salisbury  replied,  some  two  weeks  later,  that  the  Attorney- 
General  of  British  Guayana  was  expected  in  London  soon,  and 
that  it  was  desirable  to  postpone  the  discusfion  until  his  arrival. 

The  Attorney-General  did  not  arrive  until  November ;  and  it  was 
not  until  February  of  the  next  year  that  Dr.  Rojas  received  Lord 
Salisbury's  reply,  which  was  that  he  could  not  accept  the  Moroco 
river  as  the  boundary  on  the  coast,  but  would  consider  any  con- 
ventional line  beginning  further  westward. 

Nine  days  later,  Dr.  Rojas  proposed,  as  a  compromise,  a  conven- 
tional boundary  line  beginning  on  the  coast  one  mile  westward  of 
the  mouth  of  the  Moroco,  extending  thence  southward  to  the  six- 
tieth degree  of  longitude,  and  thence  in  general  direction  south- 
eastward to  the  confines  of  both  countries.  In  submitting  this 
proposition,  he  said  that  in  case  it  should  not  be  accepted,  he  saw 
no  prospect  of  settlement  except  by  friendly  arbitration. 

A  change  of  ministry  soon  followed,  and  Lord  Granville,  as  the 
successor  of  Salisbury,  declined  to  consider  Dr.  Rojas's  proposition  j 
but  in  a  personal  conference  which  followed,  in  September,  1881, 
his  lordship  proposed,  as  a  substitute,  the  following  line: 

Beginning  twenty-nine  miles  northeast  of  the  mouth  of  the  Bar- 
ima  river,  and  running  thence  southward  to  the  crest  of  Mt.  Tari- 
kita  on  the  eighth  parallel,  north  latitude ;  thence  west  along  that 

^  This  proposition  by  Lord  Salisbury  was  a  most  astounding  one,  not  only  from 
a  historical  point  of  view,  but  no  less  so  from  the  legal  aspects  of  the  case. 
Reasons  of  mere  internal  convenience  may  be  applicable  in  a  division  of  property 
held  jointly;  but  they  are  hardly  applicable  in  cases  like  this  where  the  question 
at  issue  is  one  of  boundary  between  two  contiguous  States.  Still  less  is  it  applica- 
ble for  the  purpose  of  enabling  one  of  the  parties  to  take  advantage  of  its  own 
wrong. 


20 

parallel  to  where  the  old  Schomburgk  line  crosses  the  Acarabisi 
river;  thence  along  the  Acarabisi  to  its  confluence  with  the  Cuy- 
uni ;  thence  along  the  Cuyuni  to  its  source ;  and  thence  in  direct 
line  to  a  point  where  the  "  Schomburgk  line  "  intersects  the  Esse- 
quibo.^ 

As  this  could  not  be  accepted  by  Venezuela,  Dr.  Rojas  formally 
proposed  arbitration.     This  met  with  no  immediate  response. 

In  1885,  the  British  government  agreed  to  unite  the  boun- 
dary dispute  with  the  controversies  growing  out  of  the  thirty 
per  cent,  duty  on  imports  from  the  British  Antilles  and  certain 
indemnity  claims  by  British  subjects  against  Venezuela,  and 
to  refer  the  whole  to  arbitration. ^  But  a  change  of  ministry 
occurred  soon  afterwards,  and  the  new  British  cabinet  flatly  refused 
to  ratify  the  agreement  of  its  predecessor !  ^ 

Subsequently,  when  Venezuela  again  recalled  attention  to 
the  boundary  dispute,  and  again  proposed  its  reference  to  arbi- 
tration. Lord  Rosebery  proposed  a  conventional  boundary  line 
coupled  with  a  condition  that  the  Orinoco  river  be  declared  open 
and  free  to  British  merchant  vessels.  This  was  rejected  by  the 
Venezuelan  government,  which  again  proposed  arbitration. 

In  the  meantime,  the  Demarara  authorities  took  formal  posses- 
sion of  the  territory  within  the  "  Schomburgk  line";  and  in  1886, 
the  British  government  established  fortifications  at  Bariraa  Point, 
and  posted  notices  at  the  mouth  of  the  Amacura  river,  announcing 
that  the  country  was  within  British  jurisdiction  !  Venezuela,  now 
thoroughly  alarmed,  demanded  the  immediate  evacuation  of  these 
points,  and  the  restoration  of  the  status  quo  of  1850,  in  order  that 
the  question  of  boundary  might  be  properly  submitted  to  arbitra- 
tion. These  demands  were  not  complied  with,  and  the  proposition 
to  refer  the  dispute  to  arbitration  was  received  with  haughty  indif- 
ference. The  result  was  that  in  February,  1887, Venezuela  declared 
all  diplomatic  relations  with  England  suspended. 

Since  then,  however,  Venezuela  has  made  repeated  efforts  to  have 
the  status  quo  of  1850  re-established,  and  the  question  of  boundary 
referred  to  friendly  arbitration.  In  1891,  she  commissioned  Dr. 
Lucio  Pulido,  one  of  her  most  distinguished  citizens,  as  Plenipo- 
tentiary ad  hoc,  and  as  Envoy  Extraordinary  and  Minister  Plenipo- 

*See  map,  p.  23. 

'See  Earl  Granville's  note  dated  May  15,  1885,  to  Gen.  Guzman  Blanco. 

*  See  Lord  Salisbury's  note  of  Juiy  27,  1885,  to  Gen.  Guzman  Blanco. 


21 

tentiary  to  the  English  government.  In  the  character  first  named, 
he  was  authorized  to  re-establish  diplomatic  relations,  if  happily 
that  might  be  accomplished  through  the  good  oflBces  of  the  United 
States,  which  had  been  tendered ;  in  which  case,  he  was  to  at  once 
assume  the  character  last  named,  and  open  negotiations  for  the 
final  settlement  of  the  boundary  dispute  by  friendly  arbitration. 
In  case  the  British  government  should  refuse  to  entertain  these 
overtures,  he  was  instructed  to  say,  first  orally,  and  then  in  official 
note,  to  the  proper  authorities  that  "  Venezuela  would  have  to  sub- 
mit, as  France  had  done,  to  dismemberment  by  war  in  which  she 
might  be  overcome  by  superior  force,  without,  however,  surrender- 
ing her  right  of  recovery;  but  that  in  no  case  would  she  submit  to 
such  dismemberment  in  time  of  peace  by  systematic  usurpations 
of  her  territory."^  His  mission  failed  and  he  came  home.  And 
again,  as  late  as  May,  1893,  Venezuela  proposed  (through  her  con- 
fidential agent  at  London,  Dr.  Michelena)  a  preliminary  agreement 
on  the  following  basis : 

1.  Renewal  of  official  relations ;  after  which  each  government  to 
appoint  one  or  more  delegates  invested  with  full  powers  to  negoti- 
ate a  treaty  of  boundaries ;  all  points  of  diflerence  on  which  the 
delegates  might  not  be  able  to  agree,  to  be  referred  to  an  arbiter 
juris,  to  be  named  by  mutual  concert  of  both  governments : 

2.  Venezuela  to  agree  to  the  conclusion  of  a  new  treaty  of  com- 
merce revoking  the  thirty  per  cent,  duty  on  imports  from  the 
British  West  Indies,  and  substituting  a  duty  of  limited  duration, 
such  as  that  proposed  by  Lord  Granville  in  18S4-5  : 

3.  All  existing  claims  by  British  subjects  against  Venezuela  to 
be  referred  to  a  commission  ad  hoc ;  all  such  claims  arising  in  the 
future  to  be  adjudicated  by  the  Federal  Supreme  Court,  as  the 
Constitution  of  the  Republic  provides : 

4.  Both  governments  to  acknowledge  and  declare  the  statiis  quo  of 
1850;  the  same  to  be  maintained  until  the  boundary  question 
should  be  finally  settled  as  provided  for  in  item  number  1 : 

5.  The  preliminary  agreement,  on  the  basis  thus  indicated,  to  be 
forthwith  submitted  to  the  ratification  of  both  governments ;  and 
after  the  exchange  of  ratifications,  the  diplomatic  relations  between 
the  two  governments  to  be  considered  re-established.  ^ 

^See  Libro  Amarillo  of  Venezuela,  1891,  series  B.  C.  V. 

'  See  Memorandum  by  Dr.  Jose  Andrade,  Venezuelan  minister  at  Washington, 
of  March  31,  1894,  published  in  "Foreign  Relations  of  the  United  States,"  pp 
810-840,  inclusive. 


22 

This  proposition  was  not  replied  to  by  Lord  Rosebery  until  the 
3d  of  July  following,  and  then  only  in  part.  He  objected  to  it  on 
the  ground  that  it  involved  a  reference  to  arbitration,  "  which  prac- 
tically reduced  it  to  a  form  which  had  been  repeatedly  declined  by 
Great  Britain."  As  to  the  status  quo  of  1850,  "that,"  he  said,  "was 
quite  impossible;  Great  Britain  declined  to  evacuate  what  had 
been  for  years  constituted  an  integral  portion  of  British  Guinea." 
He  could  accept  no  status  quo,  "  except  that  now  existing."  He 
therefore  proposed  that  both  governments  agree  (as  soon  as  ofl&cial 
relations  should  be  re-established)  that  one  or  more  delegates  be 
named  by  each  government  with  full  power  to  conclude  a  frontier 
treaty ;  "  it  being  agreed  that  the  territory  in  dispute  lies  west  of 
the  line  laid  down  in  the  map  communicated  to  the  Government 
of  Venezuela  on  the  19th  of  March,  1890,^  and  to  the  east  of  a  line, 
to  be  marked  on  said  map,  running  from  the  source  of  the  river 
Cumano  down  that  stream  and  up  the  Aima,  and  so  along  the 
Sierra  of  Usupamo,  and  that  the  decision  of  doubtful  points,  and 
the  laying  down  of  a  frontier  on  the  line  of  which  the  delegates 
may  be  unable  to  agree,  shall  be  submitted  to  the  final  decision  of 
a  judicial  arbitrator,  to  be  appointed,  should  the  case  arise,  by 
common  agreement  between  the  two  governments."  ^ 

An  examination  of  the  map  here  referred  to  shows  this  proposi- 
tion to  be  very  much  less  favorable  to  Venezuela  than  that  made 
to  Dr.  Pulido  by  Lord  Salisbury  in  1890,  which,  in  its  turn,  was 
very  much  less  favorable  than  that  made  by  Lord  Rosebery  himself 
in  1886.  Having  rejected  both  of  these,  Venezuela  could  hardly 
have  been  expected  to  accept  a  third  which  was  infinitely  more 
objectionable  than  either.  Dr.  Michelena,  however,  in  communi- 
cating this  refusal,  expressed  a  desire  that  the  British  government 
should  consent  to  resume  the  discussion  of  a  preliminary  agreement 
with  a  view  to  friendly  arbitration. 

^  See  map,  p.  23. 

*  Translated  into  plain  language,  the  proposition  was  about  this:  Great  Britain 
insisted  that  the  validity  of  her  claina  to  the  territory  in  dispute  be  conceded  as  a 
condition  precedent  to  the  arbitration  of  the  question  whether  Venezuela  is  en- 
titled to  other  territory  not  hitherto  in  dispute  1  When  the  British  official  publi- 
cation known,  as  the  States^nan's  Year  Book,  came  out  in  1877,  it  gave  the  area  of 
British  Guinea  at  76,000  square  miles.  When  the  same  publication  came  out 
Bome  years  later,  it  placed  that  area  at  109,000  square  miles.  This  was  certainly 
a  convenient  method  of  acquiring  33,000  square  miles  of  territory,  the  title  to 
which  must  be  regarded  as  too  sacred  to  be  inquired  into  by  an  arbitral  commis- 
sion 1 


24 

In  his  reply,  dated  September  the  12th,  Lord  Rosebery  said  that 
it  did  not  appear  to  Her  Majesty's  government  that  there  was  a  way 
open  for  any  agreement  which  they  could  accept  concerning  the 
question  of  boundary,  but  that  they  were  disposed  to  give  **  their 
best  attention  to  any  practicable  proposals  that  might  be  offered,'* 
etc. 

On  the  29th  of  the  same  month,  Dr.  Michelena  replied  to  this, 
expressing  his  deep  regret  that  the  condition  of  affairs  remained 
subject  to  the  serious  disturbances  which  the  de  facto  occupancy  and 
proceedings  of  Great  Britain  could  hardly  fail  to  produce;  and 
protested,  in  the  name  of  his  government,  that  Venezuela  would 
never  consent  that  such  occupancy  and  proceedings  be  adduced  in 
evidence  to  legitimatize  an  interference  with  her  territorial  rights 
and  jurisdiction. 

Thus  ended  the  last  direct  effort  to  bring  the  question  of  bound- 
ary to  some  satisfactory  termination. 


V. 

From  this  brief  review  of  the  case,  it  will  be  observed  that,  pre- 
vious to  the  year  1840,  Great  Britain  had  not  extended  her  occu- 
pancy beyond  the  Moroco  river,  nor  even  intimated  a  purpose  to 
lay  claim  to  any  territory  beyond  it.  Suddenly,  in  the  latter  part 
of  that  year,  she  made  an  attempt  to  extend  her  occupancy  west- 
ward and  southward  as  far  as  the  mouth  of  the  Barima  river,  where 
she  arbitrarily  fixed  the  starting  point  of  a  frontier  line,  known  as 
"  the  Schomburgk  line."  In  1844,  she  receded  from  this  position, 
disclaimed  the  Schomburgk  line,  ordered  it  obliterated,  and  pro- 
posed what  afterwards  became  known  as  "  the  Aberdeen  line," 
beginning  near  the  mouth  of  the  Moroco  river.  In  1881,  she 
again  removed  the  starting  point  of  a  divisional  line  to  a  distance 
of  twenty-nine  miles  west  of  the  Moroco  river,  generally  referred 
to  as  "  Lord  Granville's  line."  In  1886,  she  again  shifted  position 
and  proposed  what  is  known  as  "the  first  Rosebery  line,"  beginning 
west  of  the  Guaima  river.  In  1890,  she  shifted  position  again  and 
proposed  "the  Salisbury  line,"  beginning  at  the  mouth  of  the 
Amacura  river — thus  claiming  control  of  the  main  outlet  of  the 
Orinoco.  And,  finally,  in  1893,  still  advancing  westward  and  south- 
ward into  what  had  never  before  been  disputed  as  Venezuelan 
territory,  she  proposed  a  boundary  line  from  the  southwest  of  the 


25 

Amacura  river,  running  so  as  to  include  the  headwaters  of  the 
Cumano  and  the  Sierra  of  Usuparao.^ 

These  facts  carry  their  own  comment.  Studied  in  connection 
with  any  good  map  of  the  country,  they  have  a  startling  signifi- 
■cance.  The  South  American  continent,  by  its  peculiar  configura- 
tion, is  naturally  divided  into  three  immense  valleys — the  Ori- 
noco, the  Amazon,  and  the  Plata,  Each  of  these  valleys  is,  in 
itself,  a  complete  network  of  fiuviatile  navigation,  open  from  the 
€ea  to  the  remote  interior.  Those  of  the  Guayaquil,  Atrata,  and 
Magdalena  are  of  but  little  consequence  in  comparison ;  for  the 
chain  of  the  Andes,  extending  from  Patagonia  along  the  Pacific, 
and  thence  eastward  along  the  Caribbean  to  the  Gulf  of  Paria,  con- 
i)titute  a  natural  barrier  to  the  interior.  But  there  are  no  moun- 
tain chains  traversing  the  continent  from  east  to  west;  no  such 
barriers  to  communication  between  the  valleys  of  the  Orinoco, 
Amazon,  and  Plata;  and  those  three  great  rivers  communicate  by 
•distinct  bifurcations.  Hence,  the  dominion  of  the  mouth  of  either 
by  such  a  power  as  England,  would,  in  the  course  of  time,  and 
almost  as  a  natural  consequence,  open  the  way  to  pretensions  over 
the  others. 

But,  to  keep  strictly  within  the  range  of  the  present  discussion, 
take,  for  example,  the  mouth  of  the  Orinoco.  That  immense  river 
is  navigable  by  the  heaviest  naval  vessels  as  far  up  as  the  city  of 
Bolivar,  nearly  four  hundred  miles  from  the  ocean  ;  and  within 
this  distance  the  river  receives  the  waters  of  some  twentj'  oiher 
navigable  streams.  Above  that  point,  the  Orinoco  receives,  on  its 
eastern  side  alone,  some  ninety  other  rivers,  two  of  which  are  nav- 
igable to  within  a  few  miles  of  the  navigable  affluents  of  the  Ama- 
zon ;  while  on  its  western  side,  above  the  point  named,  it  receives 
the  waters  of  thirty-one  more,  many  of  which  are  navigable, 
and  extend  to  the  far  interior  of  the  continent.  Tlius,  the 
Apure,  which  traverses  the  very  heart  of  Venezuela,  is  navi- 
gable for  about  four  hundred  miles  from  its  mouth  and  has   its 


1  Speaking  of  this  last  phase  of  the  British  claim,  which  led  to  the  rupture  of 
1887,  Mr.  Bayard,  then  Secretary  of  State,  in  an  instruction  to  Mr.  Phelps, 
"the  U.  S.  Minister  at  London,  said:  "The  claim  now  stated  to  have  been  put  forth 
by  the  authorities  of  British  Guinea  necessarily  gives  rise  to  grave  disquietude, 
and  creates  an  apprehension  that  the  territorial  claim  does  not  follow  historical 

traditions  or  evidence,  but  is  apparently  indefinite If,  indeed,  it 

should  appear  there  is  no  fixed  limit  to  the  British  boundary  claim,  our  good  dis- 
position to  aid  in  a  settlement  might  not  only  be  defeated,  but  be  obliged  to  give 
place  to  a  feeling  of  grave  concern." 


26 

source  in  the  central  range  of  the  Andes  near  the  Colombian  bor- 
der. The  Meta,  which  is  navigable  as  far  up  as  Villavicencia,  only 
a  few  leagues  from  the  city  of  Bogota,  has  its  source  in  the  center 
of  the  republic  of  Colombia.  The  Guariare,  another  navigable- 
river,  has  its  source  in  the  central  range  of  the  Andes.  And  the- 
Inriade,  another  considerable  river,  extends  to  within  a  few  miles^ 
of  the  Colombian  and  Brazilian  borders. 

It  will  be  seen  at  a  glance  that  the  navigable  outlet  of  the- 
Orinoco  is  the  key  to  more  than  a  quarter  of  the  whole  continent ;. 
and  that  its  dominion  by  Great  Britain  could  hardly  fail,  in  the 
course  of  a  few  decades,  to  work  radical  changes  in  the  commercial 
relations  and  political  institutions  of  at  least  three  of  the  South 
American  republics. 

Take  another  feature  of  the  controversy,  not  very  conspicuous- 
in  itself,  but  which  may  serve  to  interpret  the  motives  behind  the- 
aggressions  in  the  Orinoco  valley.  In  1802,  England's  military 
occupancy  of  the  island  of  Trinidad  was  confirmed  by  the  treaty 
of  Amiens,  and  thus  became  de  jure  as  well  as  de  facto  British  ter- 
ritory. Now,  on  the  extreme  northwest  side  of  the  gulf  of  Paria,, 
near  its  navigable  entrance  from  the  Atlantic,  is  a  small,  uninhab- 
ited island  known  as  Patos  or  "Duck  island."  It  is  very  much 
nearer  the  mainland  than  to  the  island  of  Trinidad,  and  haa- 
always  been  regarded  as  Venezuelan  territory.  ^  But  in  1859,  very 
much  to  the  surprise  of  everybody,  the  Beitish  colonial  authorities- 
of  Trinidad  demanded  the  surrender  of  some  smuggling  crafts 
which  had  been  captured  there.  The  Trinidad  authoritieer- 
attempted  to  justify  their  extraordinary  action  by  the  plea  that. 
Patos  had  been  previously  leased  by  the  municipality  of  the  Port-of- 
Spain,  to  some  British  subjects.  In  the  course  of  the  diplomatic- 
correspondence  which  followed,  the  island  of  Patos  was  boldly 
claimed  as  British  territory,  on  the  pretension  that  its  dominioni 
was  included  in  the  cession  of  1802.  The  absurdity  of  this  claim 
is  manifest  from  the  very  terms  of  the  treaty  itself;  for  the  cession 
was  limited  to  '*  the  island  of  Trinidad."  Nor  can  the  claim  be- 
established  on  the  principle  of  proximity ;  for  it  is  a  generally 
recognized  doctrine  that  small  islands  in  the  sea  belong  to  the- 

'The  "West  India  Atlas,"  compiled  from  "official  surveys,"  and  published 
by  Whittle  and  Lowrie,  London,  in  1878,  shows  the  island  of  Patos  to  bo  on  the- 
extreme  west  (or  Venezuelan)  side  of  the  western  navigable  channel  of  Bocas  de- 
Dragos,  and  that  the  island  is  at  least  a  third  nearer  the  Venezuelan  mainland, 
than  it  Is  even  to  the  little  island  of  Chacahacarrea,  off  the  west  coast  of  Trin- 
idad. 


27 

nearest  continent.  All  standard  authorities  are  agreed  that  the 
territory  of  a  nation  includes  the  islands  surrounded  by  its  waters, 
and  its  dominion  over  the  seacoasts  is  coextensive  with  the  projectile 
range  of  its  weapons.  Moreover,  it  was  this  very  principle,  namely, 
that  islands  in  the  sea  belong  to  the  nearest  continent,  which  caused 
the  ownership  of  the  island  of  Aves  to  be  decided  in  favor  of  Ven- 
ezuela in  1865,  notwithstanding  the  proximity  of  that  island  to  two 
Dutch  islands  and  its  very  great  distance  from  the  Venezuelan 
coast.  The  question  of  ownership  had  been  raised,  and  was 
referred  to  arbitration  ;  and  the  principal  arguments  adduced,  and 
those  on  which  the  decision  was  based,  were  that  the  island  was 
discovered  by  the  Spaniards,  that  the  Venezuelan  coast  was  the 
nearest  continent,  and  that  these  facts  gave  title  to  Venezuela  a.9 
the  successor  of  Spain. 

While  the  island  of  Patos  may  be  of  insignificant  value,  it  is  so 
situated  as  to  command  an  available  entrance  to  the  gulf  of  Paria 
from  the  Atlantic.  It  is,  therefore,  in  a  very  important  sense,  the 
key  to  the  gulf  which  commands  the  Orinoco  delta ;  and  the  at- 
tempt to  wrest  it  from  its  legitimate  owner  should  be  considered  in 
connection  with  the  efforts  to  obtain  control  of  that  great  river. 

VI. 

Through  considerations  of  prudence,  Venezuela  has  not  hitherto 
sought  to  repel  these  aggressions  by  the  means  usually  adopted  in 
the  last  resort.  She  has  preferred  rather  to  suffer  temporary  incon- 
venience and  wrong,  and  to  appeal  to  the  moral  sense  of  the  civ- 
ilized world,  hoping  that  some  honorable  termination  of  the  dispute 
by  arbitration  might  be  brought  about  through  the  mediation  of 
friendly  powers. 

The  United  States  government  has  not  been  indifferent  to  these 
appeals;  nor  could  it  afford  to  be  in  view  of  its  well  known  policy 
and  traditions  relative  to  the  South  American  republics.  Time 
and  again,  it  has  delicately  and  courteously  tendered  its  good  offices 
as  the  impartial  friend  of  both  parties.  It  has  gone  further  and 
made  formal  tender  of  its  services  as  arbitrator,  if  acceptable  to 
both  parties.  And  it  did  this  with  the  less  hesitancy  because  the 
dispute  turns  exclusively  upon  simple  and  readily  ascertainable 
historical  facts.  Ten  of  the  other  American  Republics — to  wit: 
Mexico,  Chili,  Colombia,  Ecuador,  the  Argentine,  Guatamala,  Sal- 
vador, Nicaragua,  Costa  Rica,  and  Hayti — not  to  mention  Spain, 


28 

one  of  the  oldest  monarchies  of  Europe — have  each  separately  ad- 
dressed the  British  government  in  a  like  sense.  And  one  of  the 
very  last  public  acts  of  the  fifty-third  Congress  of  the  United  States 
was  the  passage,  without  a  dissenting  vote  in  either  House,  of  a 
Joint  Resolution  earnestly  recommending,  specifically  and  by  name, 
the  reference  of  this  identical  boundary  dispute  to  friendly  and  im- 
partial arbitration.^ 

Briefly  summarized,  the  historical  facts  upon  which  the  adverse 
claimants  predicate  their  titles  are  as  follows : 

1.  Venezuela,  as  the  successor  in  title  of  Spain,  supports  her 
claim  by  the  treaty  of  Munster  of  1648;  by  the  treaty  of  Utrecht  of 
1713;  by  the  note  of  the  Governor  of  Cumina,  to  the  municipal 
council,  of  February  1,  1742;  by  the  treaty  of  1750,  between  the 
Portuguese  and  Spaniards ;  by  the  reply  of  the  Governor  of  Cumina 
to  the  note  of  the  Director-General  of  the  Dutch  colony  of  Essequibo, 
dated  September  30,  1758;  by  the  two  Royal  Schedules  of  1768;  by 
the  official  declaration  of  the  Spanish  Cabinet  in  1769,  rejecting  the 
pretension  of  right  by  the  Dutch  to  fish  near  the  mouth  of  the  Ori- 
noco ;  by  the  instructions  of  the  Royal  Intendency  in  1779,  for  peo- 
pling eastern  Guayana;  by  the  Royal  Order  of  1780,  directing  the 
founding  of  the  town  of  Don  Carlos ;  by  the  official  report  of  Don 
Antonio  Lopez  de  la  Puente,  commissioner  for  the  exploration  of 
the  Cuyuni  river,  February  26,  1788;  by  the  treaty  of  Aranjuez,  of 
June  23,  1791,  between  Spain  and  Holland ;  by  the  note  of  the  Sec- 
retary of  the  Dutch  West  India  Company  to  the  Spanish  minister 
in  Holland,  January  8,  1794 ;  by  the  treaty  of  August  13,  1814,  be- 
tween England  and  Holland ;  by  the  official  request,  made  in  writ- 
ing, by  the  British  minister  at  Caracas,  Ma}'  26, 1836,  that  Venezuela 
establish  lighthouses  and  beacons  at  the  mouth  of  the  Orinoco,  and 
at  Barima  Point;  by  the  official  dispatch  of  the  Governor  of 
Demarara,  September  1,  1838;  by  the  note  of  the  Venezuelan 
Governor  of  Guayana  to  the  federal  government  at  Caracas, 
dated    August    23,    1841,    attesting    the    acknowledgment,    by   a 

'H.  Res.  252,  53d  Cong.,  3d  Ses.;  Approved  Feb.  20,  1895.  The  text  of  the 
ReBolution  (omitting  the  preamble,  which  had  been  passed  by  the  House,  but  was 
stricken  out  by  the  Senate)  is  as  follows: 

•'Joint  Res.  No.  14,  relative  to  the  Britioh-Guiana- Venezuela  boundary  dispute. 

"Resolved  by  the  Senate  and  Hmcse  of  Representatives  of  the  United  States  of 
America  in  Congress  assembled,  That  the  President's  suggestion,  made  in  his  last 
annual  message  to  this  body,  namely,  that  Great  Britain  and  Venezuela  refer 
their  dispute  as  to  boundary  to  friendly  arbitration,  bo  earnestly  recommended  to 
the  favorable  consideration  of  both  the  parties  in  interest." 


29 

British  law  court  in  Deraarara,  of  Venezuela's  rightful  jurisdic- 
tion over  the  Moroco  river  ;  by  a  similar  act  of  recognition  as  late 
as  1874,  growing  out  of  a  homicide  committed  by  a  British  subject 
named  Thomas  Garret;  by  the  British  disclaimer  of  the  Schom- 
burgk  line  made  to  Dr.  Fortique  by  Lord  Aberdeen,  January  31, 
1842  ;  by  the  Aberdeen  proposition  of  1844 ;  and  in  short,  by  the 
publications  of  every  geographer  and  hydrographer  who  has  ever 
written  on  the  subject,  from  Sir  Walter  Raleigh  to  Noire  and  Hum- 
boldt. 

2.  Great  Britain,  as  successor  in  title  of  Holland,  supports  her 
claim  to  the  same  territory  by  the  alleged  fact  that  two  forts,  called 
"New  Zealand"  and  "New  Middleburgh,"  were  erected  by  the 
Dutch  on  the  Pumaron  river  in  1657 ;  by  concessions  granted  by  a 
Dutch  Company,  as  successor,  in  1674,  of  the  Dutch  West  India 
Company,  for  trading  with  the  colonies  of  Essequibo  and  Pumaron  ; 
by  a  reputed  battle  between  the  Dutch  and  Spaniards  at  fort  "  New 
Zealand"  in  1797,  in  which,  it  is  claimed,  the  latter  was  defeated 
and  driven  away ;  by  some  alleged  concessions  from  Holland  sub- 
sequent to  the  cession  of  1814 ;  and  by  some  pretended  treaties  with 
native  Indian  tribes  (names  and  dates  not  given)  whereby  she 
claims  to  have  obtained  title  to  the  soil  and  sovereignty  over  the 
territory.^ 

Surely  nothing  could  be  more  natural,  or  simple,  or  fair,  or  more 
in  accordance  with  modern  international  usage  than  the  reference 
of  a  dispute  like  this  to  friendly  and  impartial  arbitration.  Such 
controversies  are  in  constant  process  of  settlement  by  joint  commis- 
sion or  by  outside  friendly  arbitration  ;  and  this  is  all  that  Vene- 
zuela asks  or  has  ever  asked  since  1844.  Conscious  of  the  inherent 
justice  of  her  case,  she  rests  it  upon  the  evidence  adduced,  and 
is  ready  to  obligate  herself  to  scrupulously  abide  by  a  decision  of  an 
impartial  referee. 


^This  seems  almost  incredible;  yot  see  Lord  Salisbury's  note  to  Dr.  Rojas, 
January  10,  1880.  The  date  and  character  of  those  "subsequent  concessions  from 
Holland"  are  strangely  omitted.  Holland's  title  to  the  colonies  of  "Demarara, 
Essequibo,  and  Berbice"  was  in  virtue  of  the  treaty  of  Munster,  of  1648.  These 
she  ceded  to  England  by  the  treaty  of  1814.  How  then  could  Holland  have  made 
"  subsequent  concessions  "  of  what  she  never  possessed  and  never  even  claimed? 
As  to  England's  claim  to  territory  west  of  the  Essequibo  "in  virture  of  ancient 
treaties  with  aboriginal  tribes,"  that  can  hardly  be  taken  seriously.  She  mii^hti 
with  quite  as  much  reason,  set  up  a  claim  to  Alaska  in  virtue  of  pretended  treaties 
with  the  native  Indians  prior  or  subsequent  to  the  cession  to  the  United  States  by 
Kussia. 


30 

How  very  different  has  been  the  attitude  of  England !  As  if  con- 
ecious  of  the  injustice  and  weakness  of  her  claim,  she  persistently 
refuses  to  submit  it  to  arbitration.  And,  disregarding  all  remon- 
strances, rejecting  all  offers  of  friendly  mediation,  and  apparently 
indifferent  to  the  opinion  of  the  civilized  world,  she  has,  by  a  long 
series  of  encroachments,  absorbed  not  only  the  whole  of  the  terri- 
tory originally  in  dispute,  but  extended  her  occupancy  far  beyond 
it,  and  set  up  a  de  facto  government  within  what  she  herself  has 
more  than  once,  and  in  more  forms  than  one,  acknowledged  to  be 
Venezuelan  territory. 

In  view  of  these  facts,  so  easy  of  verification,  the  matter  has  be- 
come one  of  very  grave  concern,  not  only  to  all  South  Americans, 
but  to  the  people  of  this  country  as  well.  The  principle  here  con- 
tended for  by  England,  namely,  that  territorial  sovereignty  and 
dominion  were  transmitted  to  her  by  "ancient  treaties  with  abo- 
riginal tribes,"  would,  if  once  admitted,  unsettle  titles  to  half  the 
continent.  It  would  not  only  destroy  the  territorial  integrity  and 
sovereignty  of  nearly  all  the  South  American  republics,  but  would 
invalidate  the  title  of  the  United  States  to  the  territory  of  many  of 
our  present  commonwealths,  and  to  more  than  one-half  of  our  pub- 
lic domain  in  the  northwest. 

Let  it  be  borne  in  mind  also  that  the  country  which  is  being  thus 
ruthlessly  despoiled  of  its  territorial  sovereignty  is  not  in  some 
remote  and  inaccessible  corner  of  the  earth  with  which  we  neither 
have,  nor  hope  to  have,  any  very  direct  political  or  commercial 
relations.  It  is  the  nearest  of  all  our  South  American  neighbors. 
Its  political  capital,  one  of  the  most  beautiful  and  attractive  on  the 
continent,  is  less  than  a  six  days'  journey  from  Washington.  Its 
commercial  marts,  second  to  none  on  the  Caribbean  shores,  are 
directly  opposite  ours  on  the  South  Atlantic  and  Gulf  coasts,  and 
distant  less  than  five  days'  sail.  Even  the  harbors  and  inlets  of 
Guayana  and  the  Orinoco  delta  are  only  about  five  days'  sail  from 
New  York.  It  is  the  only  South  American  republic  with  which 
we  are  in  direct  and  regular  weekly  communication  by  an  Ameri- 
can line  of  steamships.  Its  people  are  among  the  most  intelligent 
and  progressive  of  all  Latin  America.  And  our  cominerce  with  it 
is  now  about  double,  in  volume  and  value,  our  trade  with  any 
of  the  other  trans-Caribbean  free  States.  These  conditions  alone, 
even  if  others  were  wanting,  could  hardly  fail  to  inspire  our  sym- 
pathy and  enlist  our  active  interposition. 

But  there  are  higher  considerations  than   these.     All  standard 


31 

authorities  are  agreed  that  when  the  territorial  acquisitions  and 
foreign  relations  of  a  nation  threaten  the  peace  and  safety  of  other 
states,  the  right  of  intervention  is  complete.  It  then  becomes  a 
moral  duty  to  interfere  to  prevent  the  threatened  mischief,  rather 
than  wait  till  the  mischief  is  accomplished  and  then  interpose  to 
remedy  it.  "It  is,"  says  a  high  English  authority,  "only  the 
shortsighted  and  vulgar  politician  who  holds  that  a  nation  has  no 
-concern  with  the  acts  of  its  neighbors,  and  that  if  the  wrong  be 
•done  to  others  and  not  directly  to  itself,  it  cannot  aflford  to  inter- 
fere."^ The  stupidity  of  such  a  policy  has  been  sometimes  illus- 
trated in  modern  history,  but  never  as  yet  in  the  history  of  the 
United  States.  Early  in  the  beginning  of  the  present  century, 
inspired  by  our  successful  example,  the  Spanish-American  colonies 
threw  off  the  yoke  of  European  serfdom,  and  became  free  and 
independent  States.  Very  soon  thereafter,  an  alliance  was  formed 
by  the  three  principal  powers  of  Europe,  the  ulterior  purpose  of 
which  was  the  reconquest  of  those  colonies  and  their  partition 
among  the  signatory  powers.  This  bold  scheme  was  defeated,  and 
the  new  Republics  saved  from  the  fate  of  Poland  only  by  the  timely 
and  determined  intervention  of  the  United  States.  That  was  at  a 
time  too,  when  our  territorial  area  and  population,  and  our  national 
wealth  and  resources,  were  considerably  less  than  one-fifth  of  what 
they  are  to-day.  And  yet  that  act  of  intervention  for  the  main- 
tenance of  a  great  American  doctrine,  and  for  the  preservation  of 
the  sovereignty  and  territorial  integrity  of  our  sister  republics  of 
the  South,  so  far  from  being  characterized  as  "jingoism,"  has  ever 
been  applauded  as  one  of  the  wisest  and  most  conservative  in  our 
national  history. 

Surely,  the  doctrines  then  officially  proclaimed  with  the  subse- 
quent concurrence  and  cordial  support  of  England  herself,  have  lost 
none  of  their  force  and  irnportance  by  the  lapse  of  time;  and  by  every 
consideration  of  reason  and  justice,  both  governments  ought  to  be 
as  much  interested  now  as  ever  in  the  conservation  of  a  status  the 
wisdom  of  which  has  been  demonstrated  by  the  experiences  of 
three-quarters  of  a  century.  An  abandonment  of  those  doctrines 
now  by  the  United  States,  and  a  repudiation  of  that  status  now  by 
England,  would  not  only  be  an  act  of  bad  faith,  dishonorable  to 
both,  but  would  involve  international  disputes  and  complications 
the  end  and  consequences  of  which  are  beyond  conjecture. 

*  Phillimore,  Int.  Law,  vol.  I.,  part  IV.,  chap.  I. 


32 

Still,  if  England  should  finally  decide  upon  this  course,  and 
under  the  flimsy  pretext  of  a  boundary  dispute  of  her  own  seek- 
ing, and  which  she  has  hitherto  obstinately  refused  to  adjust  upon 
any  just  and  reasonable '^basis,  she  should  persist  in  her  efforts 
to  extendjher  colonial  system  within  the  territory  and  jurisdiction 
of  an  independent  American  republic,  that  fact  would  be  but  an 
additional  reason,  if  any  were  necessary,  why  the  United  States 
phould  reaffirm,  and  maintain  at  all  hazards,  the  principles  of  the 
declaration  of  1823.  The  only  alternative  would  be  an  explicit 
and  final  abandonment  of  those  principles;  and  that  would  involve 
a  sacrifice  of  national  honor  and  prestige  such  as  no  first-class  power 
is  likely  ever  to  make,  even  for  the  sake  of  peace. 


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